مشغله اعضای هیات مدیره و تصمیم‌های مالی با تأکید بر مراحل چرخه عمر شرکت

الف. فارسی
افالطونی، عباس. .1402 کاربرد اقتصادسنجی در پژوهشهای کمی حسابداری، چاپ اول، انتشارات
ترمه، تهران.
آقایی، محمدعلی و نوروزی، محماد و بیاات، مرتضای و محابخاواه، محماد. .1397 چرخاه عمار،
ریس پذیری و احساسات سهامداران: شواهدی از بورس اوراق بهاادار تهاران، پیشارفتهاای
حسابداری، )1( ،10 .1-28
بذرافشان، آمنه و خراسانیان، آیناز. .1398 بررسی رابطه بین مدیران چندشغله و مادیریت ساود باا
تأکید بر نقش راهبردی شرکتی در صانای تولیادی باورس اوراق بهاادار تهاران، دوفصالنامه
صنعت و دانشگاه، )1( ،12 .51-62
سازمان بورس اوراق بهادار تهران. .1401 دستورالعمل حاکمیات شارکتی ناشاران ثبات شاده نازد
سازمان بورس و اوراق بهادار، 22 آذر ،1401 تهران.
سواری، ضحی و رستمی، محمدرضا و عباسی، ابراهیم. .1397 بررسی تأثیر چرخه عمر بر سیاسات-
های مالی، سرمایهگذاری، بدهی و نقدینگی، پژوهشهاای تجربای حساابداری، )2( ،8 -173
.155
صفرزاده، محمدحسین و ارجمند، فاطمه و مهدیقلی، مینا. .1401 چرخاه عمار و اعتباار تجااری،
پیشرفتهای حسابداری، )2( ،14 .139-162
فروغی، داریوش و علیدادی شمسآبادی، جماال. .1396 تاأثیر هیاأت مادیره مشاترک بار افشاای
اختیاری اطالعات و کیفیت سود، پژوهشهای حسابداری مالی و حسابرسی، )2( ،9 .61-84
نوروزی، محمد و خدادادی، ولی. .1395 هزینه نمایندگی جریان نقد آزاد و قیمتگاذاری نادرسات
سهام در شرکتهای پذیرفتهشده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران، پژوهشهای حسابداری ماالی،
.100-85 ،8 )2(
382 مجله پیشرفتهای حسابداری، دوره پانزدهم، شماره دوم، پاییز و زمستان 1402
ب. انگلیسی
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. Journal of
Finance, 62 (1), 217–250.
Aflatooni, A. (2023). Econometrics in Quantitative Accounting Research, first
edition, Termeh, Tehran [In Persian].
Agha, M., & Eulaiwi, B. (2020). The alignment effects of CEO stock incentives
in the presence of government ownership: international evidence from Gulf
Cooperation Council countries. Australian Journal of Management, 45 (2),
195–222.
Aghaei, M. A., Norouzi, M., Bayat, M., & Mohebkhah, M. (2018). Corporate
Life Cycle, Risk-Taking and Investor Sentiment: Evidence from Tehran
Stock Exchange. Journal of Accounting Advances, 10(1), 1-29 [In Persian].
Ahn, S., Jiraporn, P., & Kim, Y. S. (2010). Multiple directorships and acquirer
returns. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34 (9), 2011-2026.
Alghahtani, J., Doung, L., Taylor, G., & Eulaiwi, B. (2022). Outside directors,
firm life cycle, corporate financial decisions and firm performance.
Emerging Markets Review, 50 (1), 1-20.
Amin, M. R., Mazumdar, S., & Aktas, E. (2023). Busy board and corporate debt
maturity structure. Global Finance Journal, 58, ID. 100890.
Anderson, M. C., Banker, R. D., & Janakiraman, S. N. (2003). Are selling,
general, and administrative costs “sticky”? Journal of Accounting
Research, 41 (1), 47–63.
Andres, C., Van Den Bongard, I., & Lehmann, M. (2013). Is busy really busy?
Board governance revisited. Journal of Bussiness Finance & Accounting,
40 (9–10), 1221–1246.
Banker, R.D., Byzalov, D., Ciftci, M., & Mashruwala, R. (2014). The
moderating effect of prior sales changes on asymmetric cost behavior.
Journal of Management Accounting Research, 26 (2), 221–242.
Beasley, M.S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board
of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting
Review, 71 (4), 443–465.
Bolton, B., & Zhao, J. (2022). Busy Boards, Entrenched Directors and
Corporate Innovation. International Journal of Financial Studies, 10 (4), 1-
34.
Bonn, I., & Pettigrew, A. (2009). Towards a dynamic theory of boards: an
organisational life cycle approach. Journal of Management &
Organization, 15 (1), 2–16.
مشغله اعضای هیات مدیره و تصمیمهای مالی با تأکید بر مراحل چرخه عمر شرکت 383
Chen, C.X., Lu, H., & Sougiannis, T. (2012). The agency problem, corporate
governance, and the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general, and
administrative costs. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29 (1), 252–282.
Chen, S. S., & Chen, I. J. (2012). Corporate governance and capital allocations
of diversified firms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36 (2), 395–409.
Chou, T. K., & Feng, H. L. (2019). Multiple directorships and the value of cash
holdings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 53 (3), 663–
699.
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., & Larcker, D.F. (1999). Corporate governance,
chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of
Financial Economics. 51 (3), 371–406.
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Stulz, R.M. (2006). Dividend policy and the
earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory. Journal of
Financial Economics, 81 (2), 227–254.
Dickinson, V. (2011). Cash flow patterns as a proxy for firm life cycle.
Accounting Review, 86(6), 1969–1994.
Falato, A., Kadyrzhanova, D., & Lel, U. (2014). Distracted directors: does
board busyness hurt shareholder value? Jourmnal of Financial Economics,
113 (3), 404–426.
Fama, E. F., & M. C. Jensen. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control.
Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (2), 301-325.
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
Journal of Finance, 61 (2), 689-724.
Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2013). Are busy boards detrimental?
Journal of Financial Economics, 109 (1), 63–82.
Filatotchev, I., & Wright, M. (2005). The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance.
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H.M. (2010). Does corporate governance matter in
competitive industries? Journal of Financial Economics, 95 (3), 312–331.
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2008). A theory of board control and size. Review of
Financial Studies, 21 (4), 1797–1832.
Hasan, M. M., Hossain, M., Cheung, A., & Habib, A. (2015). Corporate life
cycle and cost of equity capital. Journal of Contemporary Accounting &
Economics, 11(1), 46–60.
Hauser, R. (2018). Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from
mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 128 (1), 16-37.
Helfat, C. E., & Peteraf, M. A. (2003). The dynamic resource-based view:
Capability life cycles. Strategic Management Journal, 24(10), 997-1010.
384 مجله پیشرفتهای حسابداری، دوره پانزدهم، شماره دوم، پاییز و زمستان 1402
Hunton, J. E. & Rose, J. M. (2008). Can directors’ self-interests influence
accounting choices? Accounting, Organization and Society, 33 (7-8), 783–
800.
Jiraporn, P., Davidson, W. N., DaDalt, P., & Ning, Y. (2009). Too busy to show
up? An analysis of directors’ absences. Quarterly Review of Economics &
Finance, 49 (3), 1159-1171.
Kaczmarek, S., Kimino, S., & Pye, A. (2012). Board task-related faultlines and
firm performance: a decade of evidence. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 20 (4), 337–351.
Kalcheva, I., & Lins, K.V. (2007). International evidence on cash holdings and
expected managerial agency problems. Review of Financial Studies, 20 (4),
1087–1112.
Larcker, D.F., Richardson, S.A., & Tuna, I. (2007). Corporate governance,
accounting outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting
Review, 82 (4), 963–1008.
Lee, K., & Lok, C. (2020). Busy boards, firm performance and operating risk.
Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, 16
(2), 1-21.
Mace, M.L. (1986). Directors: Myth and Reality. Harvard Business School
Press, Boston.
Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2011). Are All Inside Directors the Same?
Evidence from the External Directorship Market. Journal of Finance, 66
(3), 823-872.
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance and acquirer
returns. Journal of Finance, 62 (4), 1851–1889.
Miller, D., & Friesen, P.H. (1984). A longitudinal study of the corporate life
cycle. Management Science, 30 (10), 1161–1183.
Norouzi, M., & Khodadadi, V. (2016). Agency Costs of Free Cash flow and
Stock Mispricing in Companies Listed on Tehran Stock Exchange.
Financial Accounting Research, 8(2), 85-100.
Pandey, A., Sehgal, S., & Mittal, A. (2019). Board Busyness and Firm
Performance: Evidence from India. Theoretical Economics Letters, 9 (3),
453-476.
Perrault, E., & McHugh, P. (2015). Toward a life cycle theory of board
evolution: considering firm legitimacy. Journal Management &
Organization, 21 (5), 627–649.
Robin, R. (2021). Busy board: Evidence from CEOs and director’s
compensation. Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, 25 (1), 162-173.
مشغله اعضای هیات مدیره و تصمیمهای مالی با تأکید بر مراحل چرخه عمر شرکت 385
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of
new board members: an empirical analysis. Journal of Finance, 54 (5),
1829–1853.
Tarkovska, V. (2013). Busy Boards, Corporate Liquidity and Financial Risk:
Evidence from UK Panel Data. Paper Presented at the European Financial
Management Association Annual Conference.
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990). On the efficiency of internal and external
corporate control mechanisms. The Academy of Management Review, 15
(3), 421–458.
Wilson, N., Wright, M., & Scholes, L. (2013). Family business survival and the
role of boards. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37 (6), 1369–1389.