Abatayo, A. L., & Lynham, J. (2016). Endogenous vs. exogenous regulations in
the commons. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 76,
51-66.
Al-Muhammad, S., MalekMohammadi, B., Yavari, A. R., & Yazdanpanah, M.
(2016). An analysis of the resilience of water resources in the governance
process of the Iranian Plateau. Journal of Strategy, 81, 145-176.
Anderies, J. M., & Janssen, M. A. (2013). Environmental variability and
collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game. Ecological
Economics. 93(sep), 166-176.
Anderies, J. M., & Janssen, M. A. (2016). Explaining success and failure in the
commons: The configurable nature of Ostrom’s institutional design
principles. International Journal of the Commons, 10(2), 417-439.
Azkia, M., & Rostamalizadeh, V. (2014). Social aspects of the irrigation system
in Iran. Journal of Anthropological Studies, 21, 11-43.
Bayat, P., Saboohi Sobouni, M., Keikha, A. A., Ahmadpour Borazjani, M., &
Karami, E. (2015). The concept of water institution and a view of the
experience of water institution reforms in other countries. Journal of
Strategic and Macro Policies, 11, 115-138.
Bayat, P., Sobouhi Sabuni, M., Keikha, A. A., Ahmadpour Borazjani, M., &
Karami, E. (2016). Effectiveness and reform of existing laws and its impact
on the performance of the water sector: Application of route analysis. Journal
of Agricultural Economics and Development, 95, 167-190.
Beaumont, B. A. (1971). Qanat system in Iran. Hydrological Sciences Journal,
16(1), 39-50.
Beckenkamp, M., & Ostmann, A. (1999). Missing the target? Sanctioning as an
ambiguous structural solution. In Resolving Social Dilemmas, Edited by M.
Foddy, M. Smithson, S. Schneider, and M. Hogg. Philadelphia, PA:
Psychology Press.
Bicchieri, C. (2002). Covenants without swords: Group identity, norms and
communication in social dilemmas. Rationality and Society, 14(2), 192-228.
Cai, J., & Xiong, H. (2017). An agent-based simulation of cooperation in the use
of irrigation systems. Complex Adaptive Systems Modeling, 5(9), 17-47.
Chaudhuri, A. (2011). Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods
experiments: A selective survey of literature. Experimental Economics,
14(1), 47-83.
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund, J., & Willis, C. (2000). Local environmental control
and institutional crowding-out. Journal of World Development, 28(10),
1719-1733.
Cardenas, J. C., Johnson, N., & Rodriguez, L. A. (2015). Vertical collective action
addressing vertical asymmetries in watershed management. Documentos
CEDE.
456 Pourali et al., Iranian Journal of Economic Studies, 9(2) 2020, 437-458
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2001). Cooperation, reciprocity and punishment in
fifteen small-scale societies. American Economic Review, 91(2), 73-78.
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Strategizing in the brain. Science, 300(5626), 1673-1675.
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2006). When does “economic man” dominate social
behavior? Science, 311, 47-52.
Cassari, M., & Plott, C. R. (2003). Decentralized management of common
property resources: Experiments with a centuries-old institution. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 51, 217-247.
Farzaneh, M. R., Bagheri, A., & Momeni, F. (2016). Analysis of the institutional
basis of groundwater resources system in Rafsanjan, Iran. Journal of Water
Resources Research, 2, 67-82.
Farzaneh, M. R., Bagheri, A., & Ramezani Ghavamabadi, M. H. (2017).
Institutional foundations of crisis in groundwater management in Iran.
Journal of Economic Research, 64, 57-94.
Hosseini Abri, S. H. (1998). Traditional management of Zayandehrud water
debate in Iranian indigenous knowledge. Quarterly Journal of the Faculty of
Literature and Humanities (University of Isfahan), 15, 101-112.
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods
experiments. The American Economic Review, 90, 980-994.
Glockner, A., Kube, S., & Nicklisch, A. (2018). The joint benefits of observed
and unobserved social sanctions. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental
Economics, 75.
Hackett, C. S. (1994). The role of communication in resolving commons
dilemmas: Experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 27(2), 99-126.
Hunt, R. C. (1988). Size and structure of authority in canal irrigation systems.
Journal of Anthropological Research. 44(4), 335-355.
Jafari, S. A. (2004). Water market approach and its requirements. Journal of
Agricultural Economics and Development, 48, 75-104.
Jannsen, M. A., Holahan, R., Lee, A., & Ostrom, E. (2010). Lab experiments for
the study of social-ecological systems. Science, 328, 613-617.
Janssen, M. A. (2010). Introducing ecological dynamics into common-pool
resource experiments. Ecology and Society, 15(2), 7.
Janssen, M. A., Anderies, J. M., & Cardenas, J. C. (2011). Head-enders as
stationary bandits in asymmetric commons: Comparing irrigation
experiments in the laboratory and the field. Journal of Ecological Economics,
70(9), 1590-1598.
Janssen, M. A., Bousquet, F., Cardenas, J. C., Castillo, D., & Worrapimphong, R.
(2012). Field experiments on irrigation dilemmas. Agricultural Systems, 12,
65-75.
Janssen, M. A., & Rollins, N. D. (2012). Evolution of cooperation in asymmetric
commons dilemmas. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81,
220-229.
Pourali et al., Iranian Journal of Economic Studies, 9(2) 2020, 437-458 457
Koukoumelis, A. M., Vittoria, L., & Johannes, W. (2009). Leading by words: A
voluntary contribution experiment with one-way communication. Jena
Economic Research Papers, 2009, 106 .
Lansing, J. S. (1991). Priests and programmers: Technologies of power in the
engineered landscape of Bali. Princeton University Press.
Lansing, J. S., & Miller, J. H. (2005). Cooperation games and ecological
feedback: Some insights from Bali. Current Anthropology, 46 (2), 328-334.
Ledyard, O. (1995). Public goods: Some experimental results. In J. Kagel & A.
Roth (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press (Chap. 2).
Motevasseli, M., & Hosseini, S. J. (2015). An institutional analysis of property
rights policy in the Iranian oil industry. Journal of Energy Economics
Studies, 46, 1-25.
Mohammadi Kangrani, H., & Rafsanjani Nejad, S. (2015). A Study of the power
structure in the water policy and management network in the fourth
development plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Journal of Public Policy,
3, 121-138.
Müller, A., & Vickers, M. (1996). Communication in a common pool resource
environment with probalistic destruction. Conference Paper, Public Choice
Society Meetings, April 12-14. Houston, TX.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a
sword: Self-governance is possible. Journal of American Political Science
Review, 86(2).
Ostrom, E., & Gardner, R. (1993). Coping with asymmetries in the commons:
Self-governing irrigation systems can work. J. Econ. Perspect, 7(4), 93-112.
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool
resources. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 137-158.
Ostrom, E. (2006). The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of
institutions and common-pool resources. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 61, 149-163.
Ostrom, E. (2010). Analyzing collective action. Agricultural Economics, 41, 155-
166.
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political
717Science Review, 87, 567-576.
Olson, M. L. (2000). Power and prosperity: Outgrowing communist and capitalist
dictatorships. Oxford University Press.
Otto, I. M., & Wechsung, F. (2014). The effects of rules and communication in a
behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in north
china. Ecological Economics, 99, 10-20.
458 Pourali et al., Iranian Journal of Economic Studies, 9(2) 2020, 437-458
Palouch, M., & BaniAsadi, M. (2018). Developing a model of appropriate
institutional arrangements for integrated water resources management.
Journal of Agricultural Economics and Development, 103, 239-272.
Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A metaanalysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Society, 7(1), 58-
92.
Vallino, E. (2014). The tragedy of the park: An agent-based model of endogenous
and exogenous institutions for forest management, Ecology and society. 19
(1), 35.
Velez, M. A., Murphy, J. J., & Stranlund, J. K. (2010). Centralized and
decentralized management of local common resources in the developing
world: Experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia.
Economic Inquiry, 48(2), 254-265.
Wittfogel, K. A. (2013). Oriental despotism: A comparative study of total power.
Mohsen Thalasi (Trans.), Tehran: Sales Publication (1957).
